Threat intelligence & cloud
Connect cloud evidence to adversary behaviour - for CTI analysts structuring findings and responders turning observations into intelligence.
Who this is for
DFIR analysts
Record findings in a structured, shareable way and know which log proves which action.
Threat intelligence analysts
Map cloud telemetry onto the Diamond Model and MITRE ATT&CK, and track how threat actors abuse cloud services.
The Diamond Model in the cloud
Cloud shifts what populates each vertex - most observable evidence lives in identity and control-plane logs.
| Vertex | What it is | Where you see it in cloud |
|---|---|---|
| Adversary | Actor and intent | Inferred from source identity, behaviour, tooling, and campaign overlap. |
| Capability | Techniques and tooling | API calls in control-plane logs, OAuth grants, role changes, malicious images - maps to ATT&CK Cloud. |
| Infrastructure | What they operate from/through | Source IPs/ASNs and user-agents in sign-in and flow logs, federated IdPs, attacker-created roles/keys, exfil destinations. |
| Victim | Targeted identities and assets | Compromised principals, affected accounts/subscriptions/projects, data reached. |
How threat actors abuse the cloud
Identity-first intrusion
Valid accounts via phishing, credential theft, or MFA fatigue; activity then looks like normal API calls.
T1078.004OAuth & app-integration persistence
Consent-grant abuse and malicious apps that survive password resets.
T1550.001 T1528Federation & trust abuse
Attacker IdP trust, token/SAML forgery, cross-account role assumption.
T1606.002 T1484.002Resource hijacking
Cryptomining and stolen-key resale, first seen as cost anomalies.
T1496Data exfil from storage
Mass object reads, often invisible without data-plane logging.
T1530 T1567Defense evasion
Disabling logging, deleting trails/sinks, unused regions.
T1562.008Turning findings into intelligence
For each action, capture the ATT&CK technique + the evidencing log + the identity/infrastructure involved; assemble Diamond events along the timeline; note collection gaps; extract indicators and behaviours; feed it back into detections and logging defaults.For current attributed activity, pair this with primary reporting and the ATT&CK Groups and Campaigns pages - cloud actors and techniques change quickly. See each provider page for historical incidents.